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EDNA HARRIET STOCK, Appellant,v. GLENN L. MEEK
et aI., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Moot QuestioDS.-On appeal from a judgment for
defendants in an action to rescind the purchase of space in
aD apartment building, plaiDtUf's cause of action did no'
become "moot" by her loss of the :pace, where she had made
a bonafide offer of restoration when she gave notice of
rescission and defendants after judgment twice acquired the
space at public sales.
'
[2] ld. - Bight of Review - Loss by Acceptance of Benefits of
Judgment.-In an action for rescission, defendants were not
entitled to have an appeal from a judgment in their favor dismissed on the ground that plaintiff, in accepting her homestead
aemption in her apartment which was sold on execution under
the judgment, had accepted benefits from the judgment. In
order to benefit from the homestead exemption the proceeds of
the sale must be accepted within six months (Civ. Code, § 1251),
and hence the exemption usually must be accepted before an
appeal from the judgment can be completed.
[3] Oancellation-PleadiDg-Variance.-In an action for rescission
and for money had and received, plainti1f's testi;mony should
not have been excluded on the ground that it constituted a
'fariance from the issues, where the offered proof tended to
substantiate allegations in • valid complaint for rescission
-because of mutual Jpistake of law, and where, e'fen if the
offered proof constituted a variance, it could Dot be said that
defendants were misled to their prejudice in maintaining their
action or defense on the merits.
['] Id.-Evidence.~In aD action to rescind the purchase of space
in .an apartment building, plaintiff was entitled to introduce

[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 125; 3 Am.Jur. 308.
licK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 18; [2] Appeal
and Error, §110; [3] Cancellation, §13; [4] Cancellation, §15;
[6] Cancellation, § 90; [0] Interest, § 41; [1,8] Iaterest,131.
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'evidence extrinsic to her written agreement with defendants
which stated that. she had a permanent right to Dclusive
occupation to the space, where the evidence substantiated
allegations in her complaint for rescission for mistake of
law in that Are regulations prevented her from obtaining such
occupancy.
[6] Itl':"'Appeal-lLeversible Error.-In an action to rescind the
purchase of a space in an apartment building, the court
committed reversible error in excluding plaintiif's evidence
that fire regulations prevented her from securing exclusive
occupancy to the space as promised by defendants, since such
exclusion prevented her from presenting her ease for recovery.
[8] Interest--U8U17-Time "1'0 Sue.-The Usury Law (Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 3757) does not abrogate any common law
rights of borrowers as parties to an illegal contract, and a
borrower may bring an action for money had and received
to reCover usurious intereSt paid within two years of the
suit. (Code Civ. Proe., § 339(1).)
[1] Itl-U8U17-Who m&7 Complain.,-Proiection of the usury
laws is not waived by voluntary payment of excess interest by
the borrower.
[8] Itl-UsUI7-Who mal Compla.iD.-Payors of usurious interest
were not til pari delicto with the recipient and were entitled to .i
recover on their counterclaim in the recipient's action for
rescission of a contract, where the payors were not fraudulent,
the recipient knew of the usurious natm'e of the transaction,
the payors did not attempt to recover until sued by the recipient
on another matter, and no attempt was made to insert secretly
a usUrious rate of interest to avoid payment of any interest or
to take advantage of the treble damage provision of the law.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Thomas J. Cunningham, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part; ItPpeal from order dis~d.
Action to rescind purchaSe of space in an apartment house.
and to recover amount paid therefor, to which defendants
filed a counterclaim. Part of judgment refusing plaintiff
relief, reversed; part of judgment that defendants recover on
eGunterelaim, affirmed.
Desmond" Desmond and. Walter Desmond, Jr., for
Appellant.
Newton M. Todd, Fred A. Watkins and James J. Baker for
Respondents.
[7] See 14 Cal.Jur. 686; 65 Am.Jur. 324.
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TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff brought this action to rescind the
purchase from defendants, husband and wife, of space in a
cooperatively-owned apartment house and to recover the
amount she had paid defendants therefor. Defendants counterclaimed for interest that they had paid plaintiff on a usurious
loan.
Early in 1945 defendants purchased the Palace Apartment
Hotel in Long Beach. They intended to sell the 46 apartments
to purchasers on an "oWD-YOur-own" plan. An escrow and
trust were set up to convey title to purchasers, to pay expenses, and to distribute any profits.
Defendants consulted counsel about obtaining a permit
from the Commissioner of Corporations to sell units to the
public. Counsel advised that it was desirable to payoff a
$20,000 second mortgage on the property before applying
for the permit. Defendants raised $10,000 by selling 30 per
cent of the venture to friends. One of these investors suggested that plaintiff might furnish the remaining funds, and
introduced defendant Glenn L. Meek to her. Defendant
offered to give plaintiff a promissory note for $20,000, payable
365 days from date, in return for a loan of $10,000. Plaintiff
wished to consult an attorney and accompanied defendant
to his attorney. Plaintiff testified that she intended to buy
an interest in the venture, not to lend money to defendant,
and that attorney had advised her that such a purchase would
not be illegal but had disapproved of the investment as a
gamble. Defendant and the intermediary who introduced
the parties testified that the arrangement was always considered a loan and that the lawyer had specifically warned
plaintiff that the transaction was therefore usurious. Plaintiff
furnished the funds to defendants and was eventually paid
$20,000 from the proceeds of the sales of apartments.
In a separate transaction, plaintiff purchased a Donresidential part of thE' same apartment house, called HSpace 101"
by the parties. She paid defendant Glenn L. Meek $9,000
for the •• exclusive and permanent right of occupancy," as
described in the Certificate of Beneficial Ownership issued by
the trustee, Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles.
The record does not disclose what' use plaintiff intended to
make of the space. Plaintiff alleged, however, that defendant
had represented to her that the space could be "used and
owned exclusively" after the lobby of the building had been
completed, and that she had purchased the space in reliance
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on this representation. Plaintiff alleged that when the work
on the lobby was completed, she discovered that no one could
obtain the exclusive and permanent occupancy of the space
because of the building and fire regulations of the city of
Long Beach. Plaintiff thereafter gave prompt notice of rescission; she seeks in this action to recover the $9,000 paid.
Rer complaint also included Ii common count for $9,000 had
and received by defendants for her use and benefit.
Defendants denied the allegations of the complaint and
counterclaimed for the interest or bonus paid on the note.
At the trial without a jury, the court excluded testimony
by plaintiff concerning oral misrepresentations by defendant.
Her counsel made the following off('r of proof: "[that] a
conversation took place in August. 1945 in which conversation the defendants Meek stated and represented to the
plaintiff in this action, Mrs. Stock, that that part of Space
101 described as B in Exhibit 1 could be closed off and locked
and that that part, the doorway at A, in Plaintiff's Exhibit
1, could be closed off and locked, and all space in 101 could
be private and no one could enter. In October, 1945, we also
are able to introduce a convcrsation between plaintiff and
defendant Mepk. a similar statement, and assurance, and on
November 7, 1945 a similar conversation took place and likewise in November, 1945 a similar conversation took place
and thereafter various conversations took place between the
plaintiff and the Meeks to the effect that the space I hne referred to could be cut off, the door placed thereon, and Space
101 will be entirely a private property and no one else will
be permitted to enter . . . that the plaintiff had confidence
and trusted in the ~efendant. in making thos(' statements and
otherwise she would not have purchased the property and
after she purchased or determint'd. and was advised by the
Fire Department, and it was pointed out to her that she could
not do so, because of the. fire restrictions. .'. ."
The trial court gave judgment for defendants in the rescission action on the basis of the evidence before it. The trial
court also held that the earlier transaction between the parties
was a usurious loan .•Tudgment for tht' bonus amount, $10,000,
and interest was awarded defendants on their .counterclaim.
Plaintiff appealed from the judgment and from an order
denying the motion for new trial. The latter order is not
appealable and the appeal therefrom is dismissed. (Gray v.
Ootton. 174 Cal. 256 [162 P. 1019] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 963.)
Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal from the
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judgment in the light of the following events occurring after
entry of judgment~ Plainti« gave notice of appeal on June
23, 1948. Plaintiff did not, however, file a bond for stay of
execution. Defendants levied execution on property of plaintiff, including her 'interest in the Palace Apartment Hotel
trust representing Space 10] and Apartment 102. Before
entry of judgment, plaintiff had filed and recorded a declaration of homestead as a single person upon Apartment 702.
On or about August 6, 1948, defendants applied to. the superior court pursuant to Civil Code, section 1245, for the
appointment of appraisers to appraise plainti«'s homestead
and requested that the court order the sale of Apartment 702.
On September 28, 1948, the superior court ordered the sale
after due notice to the judgment debtor, hearing, and appraisal. On or about October 28, 1948, both Space 101 and
Apartment 702 were .sold by the sheriff at public auction to
the highest bidders. Space 10] was purchased by defendant
Glenn Meek for $3,000, credited as a partial satisfaction of
the judgment. Apartment 702 was purchast'd by one Watkins
for $4,000, of which the sheriff paid plaintiff $3,000, hel'
homestead exemption. On 01' about April 21, 1949, plaintiff
transferred her power of redemption and propt'rty in Apartment 702 to Abel L. McConnell and na M. McConnell. On
April 22, 1949, the McConnells redeemed Apartment 702
from the execution purchaser.
After the sale of Space 101 to defendant Glenn Meek on
execution, the maintenance charges required of plaintiff by
the trust became delinquent. The trustee sold Space 101 at
public auction on June 3, 1949, under a power of sale provided by the declaration of trust. Space 101 was &gain purchased by defendants, who paid a cash consideration not
exceeding $1,000. On lune 22, 1949, defendaIits made a bona
fide sale of Space 101 for $4,050 to a third person or persoD8
who are now the owners of the space.
[1] Defendants move to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the questions involved have become moot. Their claim is
not, however, that the outcome of the appeal is a matter of
indifference to the parties or that consideration and disposition of the case on the merits cannot affect the substantial
rights of the parties. They contend that plaintiff has destroyed
her cause of action for rescission by her loss of Space 101,
which she had offered to restore to defendants at tht' time
abe gave notice of rescission. The eases relied on by defendant.
c
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(e.g., Lupton v. Domestic Utilities Mfg. Co., 173 Cal. 415
[160 P. 241]; Taylor v. Hammel, 39 Cal.App. 205. [178
P. 547J), are cases where plaintiff either made no offer to
restore or else made the offer after an undue lapse of time
from the notice of rescission, 80 that no cause of action for
rescission ever arose.
Plaintiff complied with Civil Code, section 1691, by her
offer of restoration, the bona fides of which is not questioned.
Thereafter, defendants twice acquired Space 101 at public'
sales, and finally disposed of it to a third party. In the light
"of these facts, the plaintiff's cause of action did not become !
"moot" when defendants reacquired the property. (Hillman:
'f. Gordon, 126 Wash. 614 [219 P. 46, 51] ; Vodicka v.8ette, i
(Mo.) 223 S.W. 578.)
.
[2] Defendants' second ground for their motion to dis·
miss the appeal is based upon plaintiff's acceptance of her!
homestead exemption at the time Apartment 702 was sold !
upon execution. Defendants contend that plaintiff thus ac- i
cepted benefits from the judgment. Defendants rely on Turner ;
v. Markham, 152 Cal. 246 [92 P. 485], but the case does not I
support their position. In that case, the appeal was from !
the order subjecting the homestead to execution, and not
from the judgment that was being enforced by execution. In'
fact, that judgment was appealed, the appeal was heard and .
the judgment reversed. (155 Cal. 562 [102 P. 272].)
In order to benefit from the homestead, the proceeds of the
sale under section 1245 of the Civil Code must be accepted
by the judgment debtor within six months since they are protected from legal process for only that length of time. (Civ.
Code § 1257.) Thus, the exemption usually must be accepted
before the appeal can be completed. It may be proper to hold,
as did the Turner case, that a judgment debtor, by accepting
.... 'his homestead ejXemption, loses the right to challenge the order
subjecting the homestead to sale. It is quite another matter
to deprive him of his appeal from the original judgment.
. In the Turner case, the potential liability of the judgment
creditor to the purchaser at the execution sale· after reversal
of the judgment on appeal and the possibility that the exemp- .
tion proceeds could not be recovered from an insolvent judg·Code Civ. Proc., § 708, provides: "If the purchaser of real property
sold in execution, or his successor in interest, be evicted therefrom· in
consequence of irregularities in the proceeding" concerning the aale,
or of the reversal or discharge of the judgment, he may recover the
price paid, with interest, from the judgment creditor. . . ."
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ment debtor, caused the court to dismiss the .ppeal. 1Jnder
the factS of the present case, the judgment creditor cannot
be liable to the present owners of the property sold on execution, the McConnells, who have redeemed the property as
successors in interest to plaintiff, the judgment debtor, since
they will retain Apartment 702 regardless of the outcome
of the appeal. R.edemption, even by a successor in interest
of the debtor, terminates the effect of the sale. (Code Civ.
Proe., § 703; CGlkins v. Steinbach, 66 Oal. 117, 120-121 [4:
P. 1103}.) Thus, the Turner case is distinguishable not only
because of the type of judgment appealed from, but also by
virtue of the factual situations of the parties.
The motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied. It is
therefore proper for this court to consider the merits of the
case.
The Euluion of Evidence in Ihe B68cission Aotion
[3-5] It is contended that the trial court erred in excluding plaintiff's testimony concerning the conversations between
the parties before plaintiff purchased Space 101. Defendant
objected to the evidence, on the ground that it constituted
a variance from the issues raised by the pleadings. Plaintiff
pleaded the common counts for money had and received.
Plaintiff also pleaded, as a second cause of action, (1) that
defendants had represented to her that Space 101 could be
used and owned exclusively by its purchaser ; (2) that plaintiff relied on this representation in buying her share of the
beneficial interest in the trust; (3) that plaintiff learned
thereafter that the building and tire regulations precluded
any owner of Space 101 from obtaining exclusive occupancy;
(4) that plaintiff gave prompt and proper notice of rescission,
offering to restore to defendants everything of value received
from them. This complaint states a valid cause of action for
rescission because of mutual mistake of law. (Hannah v.
Steinman, 159 Cal. 142 [112 P. 1094]; Adams v. Heinsch,
89 Cal.App.2d 300 [200 P.2d 796] ; Civ. Code, §§ 1576, 1578.)
Plaintiff offered to prove the substance of these allegations,
but the trial judge excluded the evidence. Even if the offered
proof had constituted a variance, we cannot say that defendants were "misled . . . to [their] prejUdice in maintaining
[their]' action or defense on the merits." (Cod-e Civ. Proc.,
§ 469 j cf. Wennerholm v. Stanford UlI·iv. School of Medicine,
20 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [128 P.2d 522, 141 A.L,R. 1358].)
Dpfendants contend also that plaintiff's testimony is an
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attempt to vary or modify the terms of a written agreement.
The Certificate of Beneficial Ownership issued by the SecurityFirst National Bank to plaintiff is said to embody the agreement of plainti1f and defendants in the words "such holder
[plaintiff] • • • has the exclusive and permanent right of
occupancy during the continuance of said Trust, of Space
No. 101." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856.) Extrinsic evic;lence to
show mistake or fraud is admissible. Section 238 of the Restatement of Contracts states the general rule: "agreements
prior to or contemporaneous with an integration are admissible
in evidence: (b) to prove facts rendering the agreement void
or voidable for illegality, fraud, duress, mistake or insufficiency of consideration." This court has approved the admission of extrinsic evidence to show a mistake of law by the
grantor of a quitclaim deed, taken advantage of by the grantee.
(Jersey Farm Co. v. Atlanta Realty Co., 164 Cal. 412 [129
P. 593].) "It is, of course, true that where an instrument
is sought to be avoided for fraud or for mistake in law or in
fact, evidence is admissible as to what the grantor intended
to do or to convey." (164 Cal. 412, 418 [129 P. 593]. Ct.·
Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Cal. 70 [195 P. 922] ; Code Civ. Proc., .
§§ 1856, 1860.) Since the testimony by plaintiff should not
have been excluded either as a variance or under the parol
evidence rule, the trial court erred in its ruling. This error
precluded plaintiff from presenting her ease for recovery and
requires reversal of the judgment for defendants in plainti1f'.
action for rescission.
Defendants' Counterclaim Por Int".", Paid
Plaintiff does not deny that the $10,000 "bonus" for the
loan of $10,000 was usurious interest under the Usury Law.
(Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 3757.) She contends, however,
that defendants were in pari delicto and cannot invoke the
aid of the courts to recover the usurious bonus. Plainti1f also
contends that the protection of the usury laws can be waived
by the voluntary payment of excessive interest by the borrower.
Neither proposition is tenable.
[6] The Usury Law provides that any person who pays
interest at a usurious rate may recover treble the amount
paid, "providing such action shall be brought within one
year after such payment or delivery." It is settled that this
section did not abrogate any common law rights of borrowers
as parties to an illegal contract, but merely added a statutory
remedy to aid the borrower and penalize the lender. (W"t-
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Dye, 2140al. 28 {4 P.2d 134] ; Ta1iZOr v.'BUdd, 217
P~2d 333].) Borrowers may .therefore bring
an action for money had and received to recover usurious in·
terest paid within two years of the suit. (Babcock v. OZkasso,
109. Cal.App. 534 [293 P. 141]; Code Civ. Proc., §339(1).)
Since the overpayment occurred on January 12, 1946, and
the complaint was. filed March 26, 1947, defendants are not
barred from setting up a counterclaim' to recover the interest.
(Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Ca1.2d 627, 633 [170 P.2d 893].)
[7] . Plaintiff relies principally on the dictum in Matthew.
V. Ormerd, 140 Cal. 578,581 {74 P. 136], that the protection
of usury laws can be waived by the voluntary payment of
excessive interest by the borrower. The Matthews ease and
the cases it relied on (Harralson v. Barrett, 99.Cal. 607 [34
P. 342]; London If Ban Francisco Bankv. Bandmann, 120
Cal. 220 [52 P. 583, 65 Am.St.Rep. 179]) are not in point.
They involved a constitutional provision of limited applicability, which did Dot penalize the lender with treble damages
and criminal sanctions as does the Usury Law, but merely
invalidated mortgage provisions requiring a mortgagor to
pay taxes assessed against the interest of the mortgagee.
Moreover, the party seeking to recover the interest paid in the
Matthews ease was not the original borrower of the funds, but
a third party who had purchased the mortgagor's interest.
If the dictum of the Matthews ease were accepted, the protection of borrowers provided by the Usury Law would be
vitiated. The theory of that law is that society benefits by
the prohibition of loans at .excessive interest rates, even
though both parties are willing to negotiate them. Accordingly, "voluntary" payments of interest do not waive the
rights of the payors' l "Payments of usury are not considered'
voluntary but are deemed to be made under restraint. t J
(Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 266 [18 P.2d 333].) If no
loophole is. provided· for lenders, and all borrowers save
fraudulent ones are protected, usurious transactions will be
discouraged.
[8] The cases interpreting the Usury Law have discarded
the Matthews dictum. Moreover, they have refused to apply
the allied doctrine urged by plaintiff that the parties are
in pari delicto. An early case under the Usury Law, Douglas
v. Klopper, 107 Ca1.App.Supp. 765 [288 P. 36], permitted
the recovery of the amount paid in excess of the legal interest
charge. In Babcock v. Olkasso, 109 Cal.App. 534 [293 P. 141]
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(petition for hearing denied), the borrower sought both treble
interest under the law and the recovery of additional interest paid more than one year before the action. Both elements of recovery were sustained. In Westman v. Dye, 214
Cal. 28 [4 P.2d 134], the defendant was permitted to set off
all interest paid against the principal obligation. The pro·
visions of the Usury Law permitting recovery of treble in·
terest and making usury a crime on the part of the lender
indicated to the court that the borrower is not to be treated
as equally culpable with the lender. "The parties to a usurious
transaction are not to be regarded as in pari delicto." (214
Cal. 28, 35.) The limitation of the borrower's recovery to
the amount charged in excess of the legal rate in Douglas
v. Klopper, supra (107 Cal.App.Supp. 765), was expressly
overruled in Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 267 [18 P.2d 333],
and recovery was allowed of treble the interest paid within
the last year and the full amount of interest paid during the
year before that. The law in California is thus settled, although the authorities in other jurisdictions do not form a
consistent pattern. (E.g., Plitt v. Kaufman (1947), 188 Md.
606 [53 A.2d 673] (borrower not in pari delicto); but see,
Wright v. First National Bank, 297 Mich. 315 [297 N.W. 505]
(recovery denied) ; 55 Am.Jur. §§ 111-112.)
Proper enforcement of the law of usury precludes the
blanket application of the in pari delicto doctrine. One
method of preventing usury is to permit the recovery of
usurious interest paid. During the first year after payment,
the right of borrowers to recover treble the interest paid is
enforced. It would be glaringly inconsistent to deny their
right to recover the actual interest paid after the passage
of one year.
I
It has been suggested that if the borrower was a "corrupt,
collusive confidant who fraudulently inserted a usurious rate
of interest for the purpost' of defeating an action for in·
terest on the note," he might be estopped from urging the
defense of usury. (Pa~1let v. Vroman, 52 Cal.App.2d 297,
306 [126 P.2d 419], (petition for hearing denied).) In Ryan
v. Motor Credit Co. (1941), 130 N.J.Eq. 531 [23 A.2d 607,
611], affirmed in (1942) 132 N.J.Eq. 398 [28 A.2d 181, 142
A.L.A. 640] (8-5 decision), cited by plaintiff, the borrower
had obtained nearly 500 small loans from the same lender by
using the names of nominees, which were often fictitious.
forged, or "selected at random from telephone directories,
from tombstones or taken from the thin air." These fl"auds
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enabled tht' parties to circumvent the New Jersey Small Loan
Act. The borrower was denied "a reward of $50,000 to
$63,000 for his fraud on the statute." (23 A.2d 607, 624.)
Defendants were not fraudulent here; plaintiff had ample
warning of the, usurious nature of the loan but persisted in
making it. Defendants did not attempt to recover the interest
. paid until sued by plaintiff in regard to another matter.
There was no attempt to insert secretly .a usurious rate of
interest in order to avoid the payment of any mterest or to
take advantage of the treble damage provisions of the Usury
Law. The trial court therefore did not err in permitting recovery of the interest paid.
'
The'part of the judgment ordering that· plaintiff take
nothing by her action for rescission is reversed. The part of
the judgment that defendants recover judgment against plaintift' upon defendants' counterclaim is affirmed. '!'he appeal
from the order denying the motion for new trial is dismissed.
Each party is to bear his own costs' on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, d., Carter, J.,Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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